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African Integration and civil society:  
The case of the African Union 
  
Mammo Muchie, Adam Habib and Vishnu Padayachee1
 
 
The future of Africa, the modernization of Africa that has a place in the 21st 
century is linked up with its decolonization and detribalisation. Tribal atavism 
would be giving up any hope for Africa. And of all the sins that Africa can 
commit, the sin of despair would be the most unforgivable… My generation 
led Africa to political freedom. The current generation of leaders and the 
peoples of Africa must pick up the flickering torch of freedom, refuel it with 
their enthusiasm and determination and carry it forward. 
 
(Julius Nyerere, New African, January, 2000) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
For nearly forty years African integration was the exclusive domain of the 
political elites that occupied high office in Africa’s post-colonial states. To the 
extent that it occurred, these elites tried to pursue policies of regional co-
operation as a means of integration ostensibly to achieve the double aim of 
social and economic development and a reduction of dependency on the 
metropolitan countries. “When Pan-Africanists signed the charter of the 
[Organisation for African Unity] in Addis Ababa, what they had in mind was the 
liberation of the continent from colonialism and apartheid - so far the only 
elements of consensus” (Pondi, 2001: 1). The rhetorical commitment at the 
annual and rather ritualistic meetings of the OAU to end all vestiges of 
colonialism, to promote African unity, and oppose South Africa’s apartheid 
state, continued over a period which saw many heads of states and governments 
forcibly removed from office, often superseded by those even less committed to 
national development, reducing dependency and deepening democracy within 
their nations.  
 
Claude Ake has observed in this context that “most African regimes have been 
so alienated and so violently repressive that their citizens see the state and its 
development agents as enemies to be evaded, cheated and defeated if possible, 
but never as partners” (1991: 13). 
                                                          
1  The authors are respectively Professor and Director of the Research Centre on 
Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark; Executive 
Director of the Programme on Governance and Democracy at the Human Science 
Research Council, Pretoria; and Senior Professor at the School of Development Studies, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. 
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Beyond an effort to express a collective voice in support of the broader African 
struggle to be freed from racialism and colonialism, the OAU cannot be said to 
have reached a threshold of integration that can meaningfully coordinate 
external and internal political, economic and social policies to promote credible 
and sustainable institutions for democracy and national development.  
 
At a meeting of African Heads of States in Durban, South Africa on July 9, 
2002, the OAU was replaced by the African Union (AU). Rather than continuing 
the dominant state-centered process of integration, the AU has written into its 
Constitutive Act, a commitment to transform itself into a people-centered organ. 
The vehicle of this transformation is envisaged to be the active participation of 
civil society. The move from a state-centered to a people-centered or civil 
society-activated integration process raises critical issues such as how state-
society relations can be reconceptualised and reconfigured. 
 
In one sense, the formation of the AU has opened a Pandora’s box that had been 
tightly closed under the OAU. While the AU has opened the space for civil 
society to participate in shaping what  is yet to be forged as a people-centered 
AU, it leaves many questions about the nature of the partnership and power 
relations unanswered: what exactly is the nature of the participation by civil 
society? Is this merely an invitation to civil society to inform decision makers 
and raise issues for the agenda without full participation in the shaping of AU 
institutions and the making of a tangible contribution? How substantive is the 
envisaged participation? What kind of civil society participation do state 
officials and the civil society actors envisage? Will the AU foster a new civil-
society and state relationship? 
 
Our central thesis here is that Africa's integration agenda should be cast on 
rather different foundations to those of other cases. We argue that civic 
participation should be an integral component of Africa's integration agenda, 
and encouragingly, the AU has distinguished itself from its predecessor by 
explicitly committing itself to a people-centred and participative programme. It 
has institutionalized this through the establishment of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Council (ECOSOC). However, problems still endure - ECOSOC for 
example serves mainly as an advisory body, and its constituent civil society 
elements have to have the endorsement of the relevant state. This sub-optimal 
participation of civil society weakens the people-participative character of the 
AU with serious consequences for the integrative impetus within the continent.  
 
 
2. The debate over African integration 
Approaches to African integration emerging post-decolonization have varied. 
The first approach sees pan-African integration as either ‘global’ or 
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‘continental’; the second emphasizes unification of states as opposed to a 
unification that included people, liberation movements and trade unions; and the 
third approach poses a rapid political unification as opposed to a gradualist 
economic unification. Other contentious issues related to building citizenship 
identity – focus on issues such sub-regional integration and continental 
integration; nation building within post - colonial states or pan-African 
nationalism; as well as the problems arising from sub-national protests. These 
remain important to this day and are not yet resolved. We attempt here to set out 
the perspectives in each of these in order to appreciate the complexities and 
problems of African integration. 
 
 
2.1. The ‘global’ as opposed to the ‘continental’ concept of African 
integration 
These two conceptions of Pan-African integration have existed since African 
decolonization in the early 1960s. The ‘global’ conception continues to celebrate 
and recognize the origin of the pan-African movement in which all those people 
with African origin are to join a worldwide movement for emancipation, in 
which solidarity and unity is paramount with the idea of liberation advocated. 
The ‘continental’ version of African integration evolved as an attempt to unite 
the post-colonial states in Africa, and emerged after the fifth Pan-African 
Congress in Manchester in 1945. Continentalism promoted a unification of 
states, not races or other categories. Continental pan-Africanism, in its most 
ambitious version, advanced an argument for a united states of Africa, including 
the Arab states in North Africa. Curiously, under the current AU arrangements, 
the Diaspora has been recognized as a sixth region. This seems to overcome the 
continentalist vs. globalist pan-African integration bifurcation satisfying in part 
the demand of the Diaspora to be included whilst keeping continental 
representation in the process of integration. Global pan-Africanism traces its 
origins from slavery and gives primacy to cultural unity of Africans inside and 
outside the continent, whilst continental pan-Africanism accords primacy to 
geographical, political and economic variables. The debate between the two 
conceptions will not have a closure for a considerable time. As the Diaspora 
finds an institutional node for participating in AU matters, and as Darfur type 
human rights violations are attributed to the historic tension between Arabs and 
Africans, the AU will have to open the debate on its conceptions of pan-
Africanism in order to find a broad framework to accommodate the diverse 
thinking and approaches that exist (in reality) in shaping the future of Africa.  
 
Within ‘continentalism’ there are also two approaches proposed for accelerating 
African integration. One is a cautious partial approach where regional units are 
formed in order to carry out economic and technical projects and other related 
activities. The main form of grouping is thus not continental but partial and 
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regional and sub-regional involving actors from three and more states. The other 
is a continental-universal approach involving the whole continent. The OAU 
was an example of the universal approach to integration whilst SADC, ECA, 
and other regional groupings constitute partial modes of regional integration.  
The partial approaches to integration encourage unity indirectly by motivating 
joint action on common problems. The universal approach has the weakness of 
putting together contradictory governments that may not carry out action and 
may thus prolong pan-African integration. The case of the OAU has been used 
as an example for the ineffectiveness of the universal approach within 
continentalism to bring about unity. The main aim of the OAU was to bring all 
states together rather than to establish stringent conditions of membership. Joint 
action has been difficult when the membership has been so varied and failed to 
share similar approaches to problems. 
 
The problem with including the Diaspora is what white, Arab, Indian and mixed 
origin Africans think of it. Should identities combine origin or ancestry and the 
current domicile/home of an individual? Hence Indian-Africans, Arab-Africans 
and/or African-Arabs, European-Africans etc may be one way out of the 
dilemma. However identification with the existing states these communities live 
in may be greater than any wider African identity. These issues are real and 
some sensible resolution must be found in order to advance the African 
integration project with clarity and inclusion of all communities that can 
contribute to it. If the affected identity groups select their own identity and are 
free to choose that which they value and seem to define them best, then the issue 
will solve itself. Failing this, it is incumbent on those driving the integration 
project to find conceptions that can accommodate all, without alienating 
communities in Africa while at the same time permitting input into Africa’s 
structural transformation by those in the Diaspora.  
 
Each state in Africa has often defined identity as a common nationality, 
common culture, language, territory and assumed/putative shared values of 
some nature. ‘When it comes to establishing the African commonwealth or 
civitas additional identity criteria are required to create the African identity. 
Thabo Mbeki's “I am an African” concept offers a perspective on how the 
heterogeneous expression of African identity might allow different communities 
to be part of the evolving African commonwealth. For Mbeki the concept 
appears to provide a category where varied/heterogeneous communities can 
come together and express an African-citizenship based identity and pride in 
Africa whilst remaining black, white, brown, or yellow; and it would be 
inclusive of the Diaspora.  
 
It is a double invitation: firstly, it offers to people living in Africa, who trace 
their original ancestry to different places outside Africa, the opportunity to be 
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Africans.  Secondly, for people who were forcibly removed from Africa and 
who find their struggle to free themselves the same struggle as those in Africa, 
they too can become Africans.  
 
The problem of the lack of a pan-African ideology that can vigorously guide the 
African renaissance cannot be underestimated. The state-centric African unity 
suffered from lots of opportunistic moves and a credibility of commitment. In 
Africa, unity as an intention was proclaimed by all, but unity in practice did not 
progress far enough to match such expressed intentions. This gap will continue 
to exist until a pan-African ideology is developed that underscores openness, 
citizen participation, accountability, transparency and effectiveness in the 
principles and procedures for creating fully democratic and socially legitimate 
institutions for the ‘Africa-nation’.   
 
 
2.2. Integration of states and/or integration of peoples 
Until the African post-colonial states were formed the pan-African movement 
could justifiably be called a peoples movement. After the formation of the OAU 
in 1963, the main baton passed from people to governments. The OAU was 
mainly a meeting of the heads of states of the newly independent states. The 
opportunities for participation of people became closed as the OAU was seen as 
sufficient in representing the various countries and its peoples. 
 
After Ghana won its independence in 1957, there were two separate meetings in 
1958. The first was a meeting of the newly independent heads of states. The 
second was a meeting of non-governmental parties, trade unions and liberation 
movements. The first meetings of the non-governmental All-African Peoples 
Conference (AAPC) was held in Accra in December 1958. Parties and fronts 
that were invited included the Algerian National Liberation Front and even the 
predominantly white Liberal Party in South Africa. (Hoskyns in Hazelwood, A. 
(ed.), 1967: p. 362). Subsequently two more meetings were held: the second in 
Tunis and the last in Cairo in March 1961. The AAPC declined after the Cairo 
meeting. In its resolutions it called for a united states of Africa with support to 
liberation movements and it decided to set up a secretariat in Accra. Except for 
Ghana and Guinea, there was not much support from Nigeria and French 
speaking West Africa for the AAPC. While the AAPC meetings included 
liberation movements and trade unions from within the continent, it did not 
include movements from the Diaspora. When the 6th Pan-African Congress was 
called in Dar es Salaam in 1974, African Governments pushed to take an active 
part forcing many prominent scholars to withdraw their participation (such as C. 
R. James). The last Pan-African meeting took place in Kampala in April 1994. 
The OAU did not give concessions to political parties, colonial dependent 
territories, social movements and civil society organizations until 2001 when it 
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made the decision to give way to the African Union a year later. It is the OAU 
that convened the first meeting of civil society in June 2001 with a Conference 
title of “Building partnership for promoting peace and development in Africa.” 
A civil society desk in the secretariat of the OAU was one of the tangible 
outcomes of the first OAU-Civil Society Conference.  
 
A remarkable feature of the conversation on African integration is the fact that 
there has always been an identified goal that is shared by all types of political 
communities. When the OAU was formed in 1963 both the radical Casablanca 
group with its slogan ‘Africa must unite now’, and the Monrovia group who 
argued that Africa should unite gradually both claimed “unity” as the goal.  
 
Both saw the state as the chief vehicle of realizing this Africa-wide unity. There 
was no explicit recognition of the role of the people, community based 
associations and civil society in bringing about African integration. It was a 
matter of elites bringing light and civilization to the masses. The masses are 
constructed as passive and the elite as active and with agency. Thus the states 
through elite manipulation were to unite themselves for Africa and for the 
people. It was a delegated model of representation where the people were 
neither informed, consulted much less asked to counsel or participate in the 
process. That was the conception of the time. Advocates of gradualist unity or 
rapid unity often were engaged with nation building based on a single party 
dominance. They thus shun inviting citizens to express voice or distinct interest 
formally or informally to be part of pan-African integration. 
 
 
2.3. Which comes first: political or economic integration?  
Until the 1990s, those in favour of regional integration in Africa differed on 
whether political or economic integration should come first. Those who argued 
that pan-African unity is best achieved by political integration, which allows for 
the creation of economic integration, did not succeed despite the ringing call by 
Kwame Nkrumah (leader of the radical Casablanca group). In 1963 at the 
formation of the OAU he said: “Our objective is African union now. We must 
unite or perish… the struggle against colonialism does not end with the 
attainment of national independence. Independence is only a prelude to a new 
and more involved struggle for the right to conduct our own economic and 
social affairs… Nothing will be of avail, except the united states of Africa” 
(Nkrumah: 1963). Those who argued that economic integration should come 
before - and result in - political integration were worried about losing recently 
acquired political power, and unsure of whether political unity would not bring 
more chaos than progress.  
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The first generation African leaders of the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia (the 
Monrovia group) were advocates of the gradualist and functionalist approach to 
pan-African unity.  It was interesting to note that the differences between the 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Kwame Nkrumah went as far back as pre-
independence times. Whilst Nkrumah was calling for independence, Boigny 
called for the formation of a French Federation, including French-speaking 
African nations. He called France “a light which must not be extinguished…. 
France has never known racial segregation.” With such high estimation of 
France, Boigny called for “self-Government within a community” led by France. 
He wished Kwame Nkrumah well in pursuing the experiment of independence, 
but he said, “But we wish, in spirit of healthy emulation, to conduct our own 
experiment. The future will decide which of our methods is better.” (Felix H. 
Boigny quoted in Kilson, 1965: 76-77).  
 
The OAU did not create a united states of Africa. It was a modest compromise 
between the economic first and political first groupings of heads of states. Its 
charter stipulated non-interference in each other’s affairs and respect for existing 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states and a dispute settlement and 
mediation mechanism. The tension between pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism 
within the OAU continued to manifest itself when problems and conflicts arose.  
 
Mazrui and Tidy’s analytical distinction between a pan-Africanism of liberation 
and a pan-Africanism of integration (1984: xiv) is useful in order to distinguish 
the remaining and current challenges from those that have been confronted 
already and may have been overcome. The current challenge is to bring about 
Pan African integration on the basis of an internal social and democratic rebirth 
in Africa. The identification of unity as a goal is helpful, but there is a need to 
identify the path of integration that will make African unity an irreversible 
reality.  
 
 
2.4. African identity or a national identity  
There is also a potential conflict after decolonization between building a pan-
continental ‘citizenship identity’ and building a national ‘citizenship identity’. 
Nyerere (1968: 342). said that their earlier proud boast ‘ I am an African” ... is 
not a reality.” The people of Africa are enclosed as separate citizens of the fifty- 
four states. The post-colonial notion of citizenship was dominated by the nation-
building project of the elites. The issue is whether these citizenship identities are 
mutually exclusive. 
 
The expression of many identities is seen as the celebration of diversity and a 
legitimate vehicle for claims to political and other forms of rights. The 
resolution of diverse identities into compound identities and unities is often 
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regarded as suspect, bearing the implication that rights and diversity might be 
sacrificed in the process.  Also combined and hybrid identities are seen to 
command less loyalty than identities derived from origin, biology, cultural and 
other distinctive behavioural characteristics. It is argued that combined identities 
continue to carry schizophrenic, bifurcated and even fractured loyalties leading 
to breakdown at moments of economic and political crisis. The combination 
may not remove residual loyalties to the pre-existing entities. Worse, unless 
there is a new ontological base to back the compound identity, and an awareness 
of the need to overcome the possible assertion from the constituent entities, 
there will be a tendency for a phenomenon of loyalty bifurcation and even 
fractured expressions of identities within the combination to prevail, thereby 
rendering identity-hybridism continuously unstable. The negative aspects of 
combined identity can therefore be more unwelcome than those of the status quo 
(fragmented identities). This was the argument of some of the first post-colonial 
generation leaders. The more ambitious direction was the road that Africa was 
not to travel despite the universal and shared expression and appeals to political 
unity by nearly all the leaders of post-colonial states during the period of 
decolonization in the 1960s. Those appeals gave birth to the Organization of 
African Unity, but not to African unity. States retained their sovereignty allied to 
the system that subjugated Africa under colonialism without any reform.  
Nation-building in which Africans were citizens of largely disunited post-
colonial states continued.  
 
This has not prevented the post-colonial state from being challenged by 
subversion, threats of disintegration and re-making by ethnic or clan identity 
self-assertions, outbursts and affiliations from within, often aided by external 
interests. What makes the search for the creation of an African identity current 
and compelling is the fact that the disaffected take advantage of structural 
weakness of the post-colonial state, its continued conceptual arbitrariness, and 
its inability to become independent and be accountable to the population within 
its jurisdiction. If it has been said that combined identity may not command as 
much loyalty as local and less remote and familiar identities, it is also true to say 
that putting together groups that share little with each other in one state and 
splitting those that share more with each other into different states has given 
cause for identity groups to mobilize ethnicities into national movements for 
political power. There is a need to overcome and escape this perennial dilemma 
by positing a broader African citizenship and loyalty that frees communities to 
determine and define themselves whilst remaining combined and connected as 
part and parcel of the engine of African integration and unity. 
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2.5 Africa-wide integration and/ or sub-regional integration 
African integration has been pursued simultaneously at continental and sub-
regional levels. The continental level integration has faced various difficulties. 
The new leaders did not wish to divest authority to an all-African body like the 
OAU. Each state wished largely to pursue national development within the 
territory of its jurisdiction despite the fact no credible national development 
could be mounted in some of the smallest states. The fact that there was lack of 
inter-state infrastructure such as transport and communication made integration 
costly and trade of goods and movement of people difficult. Inter-African trade 
has remained low compared to that in Latin America and Asia. In addition the 
strong continuing dependency on the metropolitan powers militated against 
fostering inter-African links and building self-reliance. Poor governance and 
lack of democratic procedures and processes also contributed to the lack of 
momentum in developing continental integration in earnest. 
 
At a sub-regional level a number of regional integration agreements have taken 
place. Immediately after decolonization the East African Community was 
retained from the British, and many of the French speaking inter-regional 
activities were also retained. Only Ghana seems to have abrogated all the joint 
institutions formed under British rule. Among them were the West African 
Currency Board, the West African court of Appeals, the West African Cocoa 
Research Institute and the West African Airways Corporations. (Asante, 
K.1997: 35-36). Ghana abrogated these bodies in order to prove to Africans they 
could work together in practice to bring about a united states of Africa. 
Nkrumah, Toure and Modiba Keita tried to unite the states of Ghana and Guinea 
in 1958 and in April 1961. Ghana, Guinea and Mali formed a political union 
with a charter for the Union of African States. (Prah, 2000: 24) The East African 
Community has been through the cycle of break-up and re-unification. It is 
hoped that the break-up has illustrated to the elite actors that fell out with each 
other the necessity to work out procedures that can address and anticipate issues 
that might prove contentious in the future. There are also new regional 
groupings such as The West African Economic and Monetary Union, The 
Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic and Monetary 
Union of Central Africa, The Common Market for Southern and Eastern Africa, 
the Southern African Development Community, the Arab Maghreb Union and 
other functional inter-state and governmental bodies. The issue that springs to 
mind is whether these regional integration agreements facilitate a continental 
integration or conflict with it. There are also a number of states that join several 
of these regional agreements simultaneously with little clarity on the benefits of 
doing so. Will the regional agreements entrench the sub-regions, or facilitate 
continental integration as the post-colonial states try to entrench citizenship 
identity? 
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The other problem is related to the fact that African states join as many 
regional groupings as possible and the degree of their real integration appears 
far less than the number of regional agreements they often sign. Of the 53 
African countries, 27 are members of a Regional Economic Community 
(REC), while 18 states belong to as many as three RECs. 
 
 (Ginkel et al, 2003: p. 30) 
 
This issue cannot be settled in the abstract and must be recognized as a problem 
to be addressed with empirical analyses.  
 
 
2.6. State consolidation and threats from sub-national protests 
Another serious problem is the threat of disintegration of the post-colonial state 
resulting from sub-national interests. A number of conflicts have taken place in 
Africa that can be related to mobilization of sub-nation al interests. The case of 
Somalia is one where the attempt to group together all the Somali vernacular 
speaking people enclosed in other states, through military action by the Somali 
state ultimately backfired to a point where the Somali state itself disintegrated. 
This problem of sub-state mobilization remains a real challenge, potentially 
threatening most of the existing states in Africa. Much of the problem can be 
related to the fact that state boundaries do not coincide with national or ethnic 
boundaries. These were drawn arbitrarily and effectively split existing 
communities. Whilst the desire to overcome this arbitrariness can be understood, 
the resort to violence cannot be condoned. A much wider pan-African vision 
could be a less expensive, more liberating and productive way of overcoming 
the limitations of the colonial cartography.  
 
In summary, we have identified six potentially conflicting or possibly mutually 
reinforcing forces that complicate processes of African integration. They 
account largely for the weakness or strengths of the existing integration efforts.   
 
How has the AU managed these competing tensions, and is this sufficient for 
advancing Africa’s integration agenda? One of the more promising 
developments in the AU is its recognition that the current African integration 
initiative has to be cast on more civic foundations than either other examples in 
the world (European Union, NAFTA), or the attempts on the continent that 
preceded this (OAU). The former, of course, appear to have been driven by the 
logic of capital which found that national borders had become a constraint to 
further expansion and profitability. Africa’s economy, with the exception of 
South Africa, is still not sufficiently developed enough to generate similar 
pressures for expansion. As indicated earlier, its state elites while paying 
rhetorical commitment to integration in earlier decades had no incentive to drive 
this agenda. 
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It is only civil society, we would maintain, that is capable of providing the 
impetus towards integration. As has so often been noted, Africa’s boundaries 
were artificially imposed. Its relations between peoples and networks are as a 
result not constrained by these national boundaries. Indeed, much 
anthropological literature on the continent points to the transnational character 
of people’s engagements, particularly in border communities. Add to this the 
migration of people as a result of wars and the pursuit of economic livelihoods, 
and you can imagine a rich tapestry of transnational civic activities. It is thus 
this sector that can provide the impetus for regional integration, were it to be 
organized appropriately and interacted with on an equal footing. 
 
 
3. Critiquing global conceptions of African integration 
There is both an empirical and normative difference amongst those wishing to 
integrate Africa in what units to choose first, what strategy and path to follow, 
how to integrate and to what end. What is to be integrated: peoples, markets, 
spaces, production, goods and services, resources, values, norms, policies, 
strategies, procedures, activities, functions? What is and/or should be the criteria 
of such integration? There is also the question as to whether integration should 
be viewed as a process or as a final destination.  In the African context, Asante 
has defined integration ‘as a process whereby two or more countries in a 
particular area voluntarily join together to pursue common policies and 
objectives in matters of general economic development or in a particular 
economic field of common interest to the mutual advantage of participating 
states.’(Asante, 1997: 20). Regional integration is different from regional 
cooperation, the latter often being seen as the means rather than the resulting 
outcome of integration.  
 
Asante defines integration in economic terms only. If one wants to move beyond 
this to more general definition, integration can be defined to mean any or all-
significant voluntary and/or involuntary inter-state interactions that occurs 
between citizens, activities, institutions, governments aimed at harmonizing 
policy and unifying action and implementation among themselves. The search 
for the kind of institutional and organizational structures that facilitate such 
unified action in political, economic, and technical and dispute resolution 
spheres, constitutes the major challenge for those embarking on the project of 
integration.  
 
In our view a re-conceptualization of the integration of Africa would have to 
prioritize the integration of Africa’s peoples and not just states. The first 
proposition then is that there is an urgent need to review all forms of integration 
efforts to see how these formats may be redesigned to include the people and 
their direct representatives. A second important concern relates to the problem 
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of mimicking other integration efforts. In particular we question the dominant 
theories of integration that have influenced Africa’s own integration efforts.  
 
African analysts have borrowed freely from theories of integration originally 
developed to describe, explain and understand the European Union. Whilst 
borrowing from others is admissible, epistemological mimicry comes with its 
own hazards. Two examples of theoretical borrowing from Western sources in 
Africa by its own elites, can be cited. In the first, dealing with a strategy for an 
African economic community, a Minister from Gabon argued that: “It is perhaps 
appropriate to stress that the economic processes of the [African Economic 
Community] were inspired by the theory of optimal monetary zones, developed 
by such eminent economists as Mundell and McKinnon in the early 1960s.” 
(Ondo-Methogo in Ginkel et al, 2003: 13). The second relates to the adoption of 
functionalist and neo-functionalist theories for building the institutions of inter-
governmental authorities. “Whereas functionalism was primarily a response to 
concern with how to order international relations after catastrophic wars, neo-
functionalism was primarily a response to the need to relate and apply 
functionalist ideas to the integration experiences in Western Europe and other 
regions.” (Senghor: 1990: 20) 
 
The theory of functionalism arose after World War II to construct an 
international order that is neither a league nor a federation. Functionalism rejects 
the notion of states coming together to form a political union. States are 
encouraged rather to build particular authorities to solve particular problems or 
provide defined services. The key dynamic of international integration lies in the 
transnational nature of international problems. For example, the provision of 
railway and airline services requires organization across national frontiers. 
States need to organize functional agencies for diseases, the economy and any 
transnational problem (Michelmann et al, 1994: 22-23).  
 
Neo-functionalism adds the spill-over gains and losses when technical, 
economic and political sectors become integrated. The end point is seen in terms 
of technically functioning, and largely de-politicized institutionalized regional 
entities. It is not a general theory of integration. It is both a normative theory as 
well as a description of the European Community method of integration - a 
conceptualization of the drive to an ever-closer union of Europe.  
 
The key problem of functionalist and neo-functionalist theories of integration is 
the reduction to the technical. Problems are identified as functions to be solved 
by putting together experts. Functionalism or neo-functionalism has no room for 
people and civil society participation. The main modality of integration is not 
shared values, territory and people but economic or political functions where 
organizations are invested with authority by state elites.   
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These theories require a thorough rethink and reworking should they be used at 
all in the African context. According to Anyang’ Nyong’o, “the failure of nearly 
every initiative towards regional integration has been as much the result of 
flawed conception, defective policy formulation and haphazard execution of 
such policies.” (1990: 6). The main reason for adopting functionalism is related 
to the strategy of gradual economic cooperation, and the fact that functional 
cooperation had its roots in the colonial era with the British, French and 
Portuguese setting up sub-regional structures in various sectors and activities in 
West, Eastern and Southern Africa. African leaders and their advisors also 
inherited the conception of regional organizations from the colonial system. 
Functional organizations proliferated: thus in 1982, Senghor reported 30 
functional organizations in West Africa. Each region of Africa had growing 
numbers of such functional organizations (1990: 19). 
 
African leaders, whether they framed the integration problem as an incremental 
process or a political unification outcome, cast this in terms of opposition to 
colonialism and racialism, and seeing this framework as sufficient. There was no 
recognition that a shared democratic culture was what was critical to accelerated 
integration, in whatever way elites wished to conceptualize this. Opposition to 
colonialism and apartheid may have been a necessary condition, but was not 
sufficient to create integration.  For the entire period of the OAU’s existence, 
democracy has been seriously deficient in African governance. The absence of 
democracy is not incidental. It is systemic and structural. The post-colonial 
states that met to accelerate integration had indefensible records in human rights 
and democratic governance. The OAU did not even pretend to include civil 
society in any of its activities. Not until the emergence of the AU did the norms, 
values and principles of democracy, civil society and the African Diaspora come 
to be recognized as essential to accelerate the African integration project. This 
recognition is a big step from the OAU days and the state-centered and 
functionalist and neo-functionalist integration approaches of the past. However, 
civil society participation in African integration within the AU still needs also to 
be theorized and operationalized, and vestiges of narrow functionalist and neo-
functionalist tendencies within it tackled and eliminated. 
 
In the past African states did not cede any power to pan-African authorities such 
as the OAU. It remains to be seen whether the AU will be any different.  The 
other problem is that unlike their European counterparts, all inter-African 
organizations to date, including the AU, have suffered from a lack of finance, 
managerial and administrative skills, and therefore are forced to rely on external 
funding, and become vulnerable to external influences. One example is the 
African signature to the Lagos Plan of action of 1980. That plan aimed to 
transform the continent through making the well-being of ordinary people the 
foundation of the long-term structural transformation of the African economy. 
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Immediately afterwards, in 1981, the World Bank issued its accelerated 
development of Sub-Saharan Africa, otherwise known as the Berg Report, and 
which launched the structural adjustment programme in Africa. The Berg plan 
made receipt of IMF-World Bank loans conditional on following short-term 
stabilization of balance of payments (IMF) and structural adjustment of 
economic and social policies (World Bank). Country after country moved to 
sign the Berg alternative to the African Lagos Plan of Action in order to acquire 
loans. The IMF and World Bank insisted that each Government must be 
evaluated individually and pass the test individually, thereby undermining any 
integrative regional economic agenda.  
 
An important consideration in integrating Africa is the need to construct shared 
values or norms that those wishing to pursue integration are committed to. This 
must be guided by democratic values. These norms are critical to further deepen 
integration and include the strict observance of human rights, the unfettered 
expansion of the African civil and public sphere, the rule of law, respect and 
toleration of the right to be wrong. Such norms may be important for the 
deepening of democratic processes of pan African integration and the ultimate 
desired unification of Africa, as well as the democratization of the interaction of 
state, the people and society. Africa will unite faster if Africans embark on 
democratization drives and create democratic institutions based on the logic of 
the self-empowerment of the people on the foundation of an effective and 
engaged state civil society nexus. Most African states are hopelessly dependent 
on something called budget substitution; that literally amounts to outsourcing 
their budgetary needs to donors that use this budgetary support to dictate 
conditions and influence local policy often detrimental to creating the engaged 
society and the effective local state. Weak and fragile states that have far little 
links to each other but retain strong links with outside metropolitan powers has 
not created the necessary condition for integration and rebirth on the foundation 
of democracy, human rights, and good government. 
 
The attempt to remove politics from the African integration through borrowing 
functionalist and neo-functionalist strategies has led to the rejection of searches 
for common norms that can speed up an accelerated unification based on an 
evaluation of Africa’s problems, challenges, opportunities and specific 
circumstances. There is a need to bring back such norms, values, cultures and 
civilization into pan-African integration through the active involvement of civil 
society in the whole spectrum and repertoire of integration efforts. The inclusion 
of civil society will beef up the integrative power ‘independent variable’ in order 
to increase the scope of Africa integration as the ‘dependent variable’. 
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4. Participation of citizens in the African Union. 
In Africa, the main pattern of regionalization has evolved in relation to the need 
to learn to cooperate, principally to deal with the historical problems of 
colonialism and racism. Anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles have historically 
involved social and political movements outside the state system. The 
democratization of South Africa has opened up the space to develop regional 
systems including the active involvement of civil society as a co-driver of the 
process. The inclusion of civil society in integrating Africa cannot however be 
simply a matter of inviting to civil society to join existing state-dominated 
regional arrangements. The power distribution amongst the units forming the 
integrative power has to be re-negotiated. If this is the case the power to set 
agenda, define issues and determine the path will no longer be the monopoly of 
governments but to a new partnership of people with governments.  The whole 
process of integration has to be revolutionized by placing it firmly within the 
context of a democratizing architecture. We offer some tentative ideas that could 
contribute to this re-thinking of African regional systems by suggesting a 
democratic theory of integration that sees civil society as a central actor in the 
process. 
 
With the eclipse of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the birth of the 
African Union (AU), came also the need to assert the values of human rights, 
human security, rule of law, the mutual supervision of each other’s conduct and 
multi-party elections and so on. The opportunity to bring in values and norms 
has increased with the emergence of the AU. But how does the AU see the 
inclusion or representation of civil society?  Civil society is to participate in the 
AU through the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC). Article 22 
of the AU’s Constitutive Act provides that: 
 
1. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be an advisory organ 
composed of different social and professional groups of the member states 
of the union. 
2. The functions, powers, composition and organization of the Economic, 
Social and Cultural Council shall be determined by the Assembly. 
 
ECOSOC does not require lengthy ratification like the African Court of Justice 
and the African Parliament. At the Maputo Summit in July, 2003, a draft statute 
recommended that ECOSOC should be composed of 150 civil society 
organizations “representing social groups such as women, youth, the elderly and 
persons with disabilities, professional groups such as doctors, lawyers, media 
and business organizations; NGOs and community based organizations; 
organizations of workers and employers; traditional leaders, academia, religious 
and cultural associations.” (Cillers, 2003: 31).  Political parties are excluded 
because they can be represented in the African Parliament. The 150 members 
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are distributed as follows: two civil society organizations are to be drawn from 
each member state. There will be 24 transnational sectoral civil society 
organizations selected at regional and continental level. There will be 20 
representing the Diaspora. Gender equality is expected to be expressed through a 
50 percent participation rate by women members of civil society. 
 
Civil society has been given the opportunity by the protocol to invite candidates 
for membership of ECOSOC and to process such applications. Thus selection of 
membership to ECOSOC is not exclusively government led. It is contested. It is 
not only the AU assembly but also civil society groups that get elected or 
selected to the ECOSOC. The expectation is that ECOSOC will meet in plenary 
once in two years. The advisory function of the Council is expected to be 
performed in 10 sectoral cluster committees. The latter is to be co-coordinated 
by a 12-member steering committee. 
 
Evidence to date suggests that there may be a desire by some states to control, 
which NGOs qualify. Disproportionate power still resides in the AU 
governments. It is not clear yet how the power redistribution and reallocation 
will play itself out. In other words, it is not clear what power civil society groups 
in ECOSOC will have. How independent will they be? What prevents them 
from being co-opted? 
 
Another question is whether the kind of participation that civil society is 
expected to secure in the AU is substantive in the sense that it will change the 
integrative equation as we tried to conceptualize above. What is the internal 
distribution of powers amongst the actors that are engaged in building 
integrative power in order to increase the scope, depth and breadth of African 
integration? What limits will the advisory character of ECOSOC set?  
 
If we assume that civil society participation will enhance African integration it is 
important to begin to activate and mobilize civil society organs and movements 
across the continent.  If African governments do not form integrative power 
relationships, communications and power distribution with their citizens, they 
will be likely to search for external allies that may well create problems and 
slow down the process of integration.  
 
In short, the institutionalization of civic participation in the AU, while an 
advance, does not go far enough. Both the advisory character of this 
participation and the fact that it requires the consent of the relevant national 
government, suggests that civil society’s status within the institutions of the AU 
is not sufficient to enable it to serve as the impetus for a renewed African 
integration initiative. 
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More has to be done if civil society has to become this impetus. It requires 
initiatives from both civil society and the state. With regards to the former, 
much of civil society to date is established and operates within national 
boundaries. In recent years, some transnational activities have become evident, 
for instance, the South African Trade Union Federation’s support for the labour 
rights of their counterparts in neighbouring African countries. Transnational 
civil society does not as yet have sufficient critical mass to warrant it being 
taken seriously by regional political elites. Much more organization and 
mobilization thus needs to happen on transnational foundations. 
 
Political elites could also do more in this regard. They need to become more 
open to the possibility of a more equal partnership between themselves and civil 
society. Of course many of them would argue that there is no need for such an 
equal partnership for they, having been elected, have the greater legitimacy to 
engage in regional decision-making. But sources of legitimacy can be multifold. 
As the corporate sector gets consulted on matters economic because of their 
command over investment, so too must civil society be included in decision-
making concerning the peoples of Africa. 
 
How should these interactions be organized? Probably through structures very 
similar to the existing ones, but constructed on a more equal footing. Civil 
society recommendations cannot simply be advisory, and their participation 
should not be dependent on the sanction of state elites. Of course civil society 
cannot and must not be treated as a homogenous entity in these deliberations. On 
different issues, different types of civic entities must have prominence. On 
matters pertaining to agriculture, for instance, collectives of farmers must be 
heard more prominently than, for instance, unions. On matters academic, the 
academy and the student federations must be consulted. This then imagines a 
civil society that is more plurally constructed, and political-civic engagement 
must be mindful of, and cater for such plurality. 
 
 
5. South Africa’s role in African integration. 
It needs to be borne in mind that every integration initiative should have a lead 
agent, and it may well be argued that Africa’s has to be South Africa. Not only 
is the country economically dominant and now the largest contributor to foreign 
direct investment in Africa, but it is also the architect of much of the peace 
building and institution-building exercises on the continent. However, while 
conceding the value of South African democracy for the continent, the nature 
and form of its economic expansion is more contentious (on the latter issue see 
for example Issa Shivji, 2005a, 2005b). In a recent paper Habib and Selinyane  
in assessing the country’s role in the region, have argued provocatively that:  
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South Africa’s role should in fact be one of hegemon. Simply being a pivotal 
state, albeit an important one, means rejecting the role of leadership. This is 
not in South Africa’s interests, nor those of the region. Stability in the region, 
and, as a result, development and democracy, will only be achieved when a 
regional hegemon is prepared to underwrite these objectives. So long as that 
does not happen, South Africa’s economic goals will remain compromised. 
For, as President Thabo Mbeki has often stated, the fate of a democratic South 
Africa is inextricably bound up with what happens on the rest of the 
continent.  
(2005: 9) 
 
Habib and Selinyane advocate that South Africa behaves as a regional hegemon 
willing to advance a regional political and socio-economic vision and underwrite 
the costs of such an exercise.  They contest the view that hegemonic behaviour 
need take an imperial form. Instead, they argue that the United States’s 
engagement with Western Europe in the post-World War II period provides 
evidence for hegemonic behaviour that can have systemically beneficial 
outcomes. Arguing that South Africa’s foreign policy has been bifurcated, even 
schizophrenic at times, they nevertheless remark that South Africa appears less 
ambiguous about its role in building institutions for continental integration, and 
representing the continent on the world stage.  
 
In this context of arguing for a ‘meeting’ between the state and civil society in 
the arena of foreign policy, Habib and Nthakeng observe that the regional or 
continental role of South Africa civil society organizations remains limited. 
 
…despite the continental forays of COSATU, much more still needs to be 
done to create a truly regional civil society, which is necessary of the 
hegemonic project is to operate in a continentally beneficial way. Its task 
would be to constrain South Africa’s political and economic elites from acting 
in an imperially expansionist manner [if this can be achieved] Africa may 
have its first serious chance to achieve stability, democracy, and meaningful 
development. 
 (2005: 17)  
 
The crucial task, Habib and Nthakeng maintain, is to determine the structural 
characteristics that make political elites in the hegemon more inclined to eschew 
imperial ambitions and construct a more systemically beneficial regional 
engagement. One such structural feature among others, they believe, is the 
emergence of transnational civic relations. The lesson emanating from their 
work is that it may be in the interest of regional elites to both facilitate and 
accommodate transnational civil society. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
The first phase of Africa's struggle against colonialism and white minority rule 
is over. The second and more difficult phase of integrating Africa has just 
begun. There is a need for a strong intellectual debate to find feasible pathways 
and signposts to make this integration possible.  Through this debate and other 
citizen-based and community activities, we need to work out the values and 
visions that Africans must share to accelerate the formation of integrated Africa. 
A shared value and vision, which ideology provides, is currently missing from 
the equation. This missing link has to be discovered. The sooner it is discovered; 
the better will be Africa’s future that has yet to arrive! 
 
If the AU is to emerge as a people-centered union, the people have to occupy the 
driving seat of the integration process. There is a need for a shared power where 
norms and values of integration have to be deliberated upon, shared and settled. 
The communication between civil society and governments is one that is open 
and responsive. When avenues of political representation are fixed or clogged, 
there will be a danger to the integration effort. This is not a matter of setting 
procedures for participation; there must be a substantive recognition and 
acknowledgement to ensure that the people own the integration process through 
civil society organizations and other modes of representation. 
 
A core value that will connect the logic of integration to pan-Africanism is a 
shared commitment to democracy. This will accelerate integration and pan-
Africanism faster than any pressure, or coercive and other methods employed by 
the elite. We think that a common norm, value and culture that is a prerequisite 
for a mutually reinforcing civil society and state partnership in the process of 
integration is a shared belief in democratic procedures, openness, 
communication both procedurally and substantively. So what will accelerate 
African integration process is the emergence of a shared democratic norm by all 
the actors engaged in it. What will decelerate the process is a lack of 
subscription to democratic norms of decision-making. The advantage of civil 
society participation is bringing integration and its potential benefits down to the 
grassroots. In the process there will be public education, public debate, public 
participation and open and transparent process that lead to the accountability and 
legitimacy of African project of integration.  We therefore propose the 
democratization of African integration through broadening of the base with civil 
society playing the anchor or pedigree in the process. All outstanding issues can 
be resolved in the process of democratic dialogue as long as there is no coercive 
pressure during public debate. We thus pose a democratic theory of African 
integration as a way forward to bring the future that has been prevented from 
arriving by the selfish elite behaviour. 
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